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Flows and Their Implications for
Economic Development
Introduction
Economic theory posits that capital should, on net, flow from
richer to poorer countries. Specifically, in the benchmark neoclassical
model, capital should flow from countries that have relatively high
capital-to-labor ratios to countries that have relatively low ratios. In
an influential paper, Lucas (1990) notes that flows of capital from the
north to the south are nowhere near the levels predicted by theory.
Financial globalization has taken off in the decade and a half since
Lucas wrote his paper, with a substantial increase in cross-border
capital flows. Nonindustrial countries, especially the group of emerg-
ing market economies, have become much more integrated into
international financial markets. What has become of the empirical
paradox that Lucas identified? Has increasing financial integration
resolved it?
We show that the paradox has, if anything, intensified over time,
with capital, in fact, flowing from poor to rich countries. This perverse
pattern of flows has been particularly striking since the beginning of
this decade. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have, in general,
behaved more in line with theory, flowing from richer to poorer coun-
tries. But the pattern of overall flows is ultimately what is relevant in
terms of financing of investment in a country. 
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The apparent perversity of overall foreign financing is even more
dramatic when one examines the allocation of capital across developing
countries. As Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) argue, within this group,
capital should flow in greater amounts to countries that have grown the
fastest, that is, countries that are likely to have the best investment
opportunities.
1 We show that, over the last three decades, the net
amount of foreign capital flowing to relatively high-growth developing
countries has been smaller than that flowing to the medium- and low-
growth groups. During 2000-2004, the pattern is truly perverse, with
high-growth and medium-growth countries exporting significant
amounts of capital, while low-growth countries receive significant
amounts. That capital does not follow growth has been dubbed the
“allocation puzzle” by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). 
These seemingly perverse patterns of global financial flows are
closely related to the important question about whether foreign
capital plays a helpful, benign, or malign role in the process of
economic growth. To get at the possible answers, we first show that
for nonindustrial countries, traditional measures of financial integra-
tion (such as stocks of foreign liabilities, sum of stocks of assets and
liabilities, private capital inflows, FDI inflows, or measures of the
extent to which capital flows are constrained by regulations) are not
correlated with growth. This is consistent with a growing body of
evidence that it is difficult to detect any direct growth benefits of
financial integration in macroeconomic data (see Kose, Prasad,
Rogoff, and Wei, 2006, for a survey). 
We then examine the relationship between current accounts—a
measure of total external capital financing available for investment in a
country—and growth. We report an interesting new result—contrary to
the predictions of standard theoretical models, there isn’t a negative cross-
sectional correlation between current account balances and growth
among nonindustrial countries. Indeed, for the sample of nonindustrial
countries and most subsamples, the correlation is significantly positive. In
other words, developing countries that have relied more on foreign
finance have not grown faster in the long run and have typically grown
more slowly. By contrast, we find that among industrial countries, those
that rely more on foreign finance appear to grow faster. 
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None of this is to say that there are no episodes where nonindustrial
countries grow fast and run large current account deficits—East Asia
before the crisis is a clear counterexample. Our attempt is to look
beyond short-run, foreign-funded booms (and possibly busts) to
whether, on average and in the long run, nonindustrial countries that
grow the fastest have depended most on foreign finance. They have not. 
Indeed, even controlling for the standard determinants of growth in
a regression framework, we find a positive association between average
current account balances and average growth rates in our sample of
nonindustrial countries over the period 1970-2000. The correlation
appears to be largely driven by the savings component of the current
account, not by the investment component—that is, nonindustrial
countries that have higher savings for a given level of investment expe-
rience higher growth.
2
These findings build upon existing work. Houthakker (1961),
Modigliani (1970), and Carroll and Weil (1994) have shown there is
a large positive correlation between savings and growth in the cross-
section of countries. Of course, investment in high-saving countries
also could be higher, so high domestic savings does not imply low
reliance on foreign savings—indeed, Aghion, Comin, and Howitt
(2006) see high domestic savings as a prerequisite for attracting
foreign savings. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006b) conclude that
poorer countries have lower per capita income because they have
lower productivity or more distortions than richer countries, not
because they are capital-scarce—the implication being that access to
foreign capital by itself would not generate much additional growth
in these countries.
In addition to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006a), our paper is closely
related to that of Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2004), who
constructed a “self-financing” ratio for countries and found that coun-
tries with higher self-financing ratios grew faster in the 1990s than
countries with lower ratios. Thus, the connection of capital flows to
growth seems to be more than just through financing. If that were all
that were important (for example, foreign financing is good for growth
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because it expands the resource envelope or is bad because it is exces-
sively volatile), then only inflows or net foreign liability positions
should matter. We find that neither of these measures of financial
integration seems to matter much for growth. 
We discuss a few possible explanations for the observed relationships.
First, the positive correlation between current account balances and
growth is stronger among less financially developed countries. In these
countries, the range of profitable investment opportunities, as well as
private consumption, for those that experience growth episodes, may
be constrained by financial sector impediments. So, investment can be
financed largely through domestically generated savings. Second, a
developing country may actively choose not to absorb too much
foreign capital in order to avoid exchange rate overvaluation. In turn,
this ensures that the country’s manufacturing/tradable goods sector is
competitive, thus allowing it to play its customary important role in
fostering growth. 
A logical implication of our analysis is that once one accounts for
the financial and other structural impediments that limit a poor
country’s ability to absorb foreign capital, the seemingly perverse flow
of capital from poor to rich countries today is not necessarily an arti-
fact of a distorted international financial system. Indeed, it may
merely be an accentuation of a historical pattern, whereby fast-
growing poor countries have now turned to financing others,
including the rich, as opposed to simply relying little on foreign
finance as in the past.   
Note that the critics of capital account openness (including Bhag-
wati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; and Stiglitz, 2000) point to yet another
reason countries may actively avoid foreign capital—the broader risks
associated with opening up, including the risks of inducing greater
economic volatility. We have little to say on this issue, except to note
that there is little evidence that capital mobility by itself can precipi-
tate crises (see Kose and others, 2006).
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we
provide some stylized facts on the patterns of international capital
flows to motivate our analysis. In the third section, we examine the
correlation between foreign capital inflows and growth; in the fourth
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section, we examine possible explanations for our findings. In the
fifth section, we discuss what our paper might add to the debate
about the current global imbalances, and then we conclude in the
sixth section.
The direction of flows
We begin by presenting some stylized facts to motivate our analy-
sis.
3 Chart 1 shows that the quantum of net global cross-border
financial flows, as measured by the sum of current account surpluses
over all countries, has been steadily increasing over the last three
decades. But even as cross-border capital flows have grown, suggest-
ing a more financially integrated world, the distribution of flows has
seemingly become more perverse relative to what standard economic
theory would predict. Specifically, in the benchmark neoclassical
model, capital should flow from rich countries that have relatively
high capital-to-labor ratios to poor countries that have relatively low
ratios. Yet, as Chart 2 suggests, the average relative per capita income
of surplus countries (weighted by their surpluses, with per capita
income measured relative to the richest country in that year) has been
Chart 1 
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trending downward. By contrast, there has been an upward trend in
the relative income level of deficit countries. 
Indeed, in this century, the relative income of surplus countries has
fallen below that of deficit countries. Not only is capital not flowing
from rich to poor countries in quantities the neoclassical model
would predict—a paradox pointed out by Lucas (1990)—but, in the
last few years, it has been flowing from poor to rich countries.
However, this is not a new phenomenon. Even in the late 1980s, the
weighted average relative income of surplus countries was below that
of deficit countries. 
Is the pattern in Chart 2 entirely driven by the United States? In
Chart 3, we exclude the United States from the calculations. Even
without the United States, there is a narrowing in weighted average
Notes: For each year, we separate our sample of countries into two groups—those with current account
surpluses and those with deficits in that year. For the first group, we then take each country’s share of
the total current account surplus accounted for by all countries in that group. We then multiply that
share by the relative purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted per capita income of that country (meas-
ured relative to the per capita income of the richest country in the sample in that year). This gives us a
current account-weighted measure of the relative incomes of surplus countries. We do the same for
current account deficit countries. This enables us to compare the relative incomes of surplus versus
deficit countries in each year.
Chart 2
Relative Incomes of Capital-Exporting and 
Capital-Importing Countries
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Chart 3
Relative Incomes of Capital-Exporting 
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Notes: For each year, we separate our sample of countries into two groups—those with current account
surpluses and those with deficits in that year. For the first group, we then take each country’s share of
the total current account surplus accounted for by all countries in that group. We then multiply that
share by the relative PPP-adjusted per capita income of that country (measured relative to the per capita
income of the richest country in the sample in that year). This gives us a current account-weighted
measure of the relative incomes of surplus countries. We do the same for current account deficit coun-
tries. This enables us to compare the relative incomes of surplus versus deficit countries in each year. The
calculations are the same as in Chart 2, except that we exclude the United States from the sample.
income levels between surplus and deficit countries by 2005, in
contrast to the widening that would be predicted in an increasingly
financially integrated world under a strict interpretation of the neoclas-
sical benchmark model.
4
Capital flows between developed and developing economies may
increasingly be dominated by official flows (aid flows, accumulation
of international reserves), which may be driven by factors other than
the basic rate-of-return equalization motive considered in benchmark
neoclassical models. FDI flows by themselves (Chart 4) do behave
more in accordance with the models—the weighted average relative
income of countries experiencing net FDI inflows is generally lower
than that of FDI-exporting countries, though the relative income of
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senders has been trending down, while the relative income of recipi-
ents has been moving up since the mid-1990s.
5
Next, we examine the allocation of capital across nonindustrial
countries. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) argue that, within this
group, capital should flow in greater amounts to countries that have
grown the fastest, that is, countries that are likely to have the best
investment opportunities. Does it? We divide nonindustrial countries
into three equally sized (by aggregate population) groups, with China
and India handled separately, and compute cumulative current
account deficits for each group, deflating the computed flows in
dollars by the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Chart 5 shows that, over the period 1970-2004, as well as over
subperiods, the net amount of foreign capital flowing to relatively
high-growth developing countries has been smaller than that flowing
Chart 4
Relative Incomes of Countries that are Net Exporters 











Relative Per Capita GDP Weighted by FDI Flows
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
FDI Flows Surplus FDI Flows Deficit
Notes: For each year, we separate our sample of countries into two groups—those with FDI flows
surpluses and those with deficits in that year. For the first group, we then take each country’s share of
the total FDI flows surplus accounted for by all countries in that group. We then multiply that share by
the relative PPP-adjusted per capita income of that country (measured relative to the per capita income
of the richest country in the sample in that year). This gives us an FDI flows-weighted measure of the
relative incomes of surplus countries. We do the same for FDI flows deficit countries. This enables us to
compare the relative incomes of surplus versus deficit countries in each year.
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to the medium- and low-growth groups. In fact, China, the fastest-
growing country, runs a surplus in every period. During 2000-2004,
the pattern is truly perverse, with China, India, high-growth countries,
and medium-growth countries all exporting significant amounts of
capital, while low-growth countries receive significant amounts. That
capital does not follow growth has been dubbed the “allocation puzzle”
by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). 
The puzzle deepens when we examine net FDI flows (Chart 6).
Even though during the most recent period (2000-2004) net FDI
flows do not follow growth, by and large they do, with the fastest-
growing group of nonindustrial countries receiving the most FDI
over the period 1970-2004, and China receiving substantial amounts.
This suggests that fast-growing countries do have better investment
opportunities, which is why they attract more FDI. Yet they do not
utilize more foreign capital overall, and, in the case of China, export
capital on net. 
Chart 5
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Notes: The nonindustrial countries in our sample are split into three groups with roughly equal total
populations in each group. China and India are treated separately. Each panel shows the cumulative
current accounts (in billions of U.S. dollars, deflated by U.S. CPI indexed to 1 in 2004) summed up
within each group over the relevant period. A negative number indicates a surplus. Median real GDP
growth rates for the countries in each group (after averaging over the relevant period for each country)
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Explanations of the Lucas paradox have relied on the notion that
the risk-adjusted returns to capital investment may not be as high in
poor countries as suggested by their low capital-labor ratios because
they have weak institutions (Alfaro and others, 2005) because physi-
cal capital is costly in poor countries (Hsieh and Klenow, 2003;
Caselli and Feyrer, 2005) or because poor governments default
repeatedly on debt finance (Gertler and Rogoff, 1990; Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2004). Yet the charts here suggest a deeper paradox. Why
does more foreign capital not flow to poor countries that are growing
more rapidly and where, by extension, the revealed marginal produc-
tivity of capital (and probably creditworthiness) is indeed high? More
importantly, do these perverse flows of capital adversely affect growth
in nonindustrial countries? To address these issues, in the next
section, we investigate in more detail the relationship between foreign
capital and growth. 
Chart 6
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Notes: The nonindustrial countries in our sample are split into three groups with roughly equal total populations in
each group. China and India are treated separately. Each panel shows the cumulative net FDI inflows (in billions of
U.S. dollars, deflated by U.S. CPI indexed to 1 in 2004) summed up within each group over the relevant period.
Median real GDP growth rates for the countries in each group (after averaging over the relevant period for each
country) are also shown.
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The relationship between foreign capital and growth
In this section, we examine the correlations between measures of
financial integration and growth. In theory, integration with interna-
tional financial markets should provide more capital to relatively
capital-scarce countries and also could increase the efficiency of that
capital by allowing for greater specialization of production among
countries. We then look at the relationship between current account
balances, which can be regarded as the total amount of finance
flowing in or out of a country, and growth.
Measures of financial integration
The first task is determining how to measure financial integration.
The most common method is to create an index of openness based
on compilations of the restrictions a country imposes on capital
account transactions—these are typically drawn from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Annual Reports on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. But, as argued by Kose,
Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2006), these de jure measures—no matter
how sophisticated—cannot capture the enforcement and effective-
ness of capital controls, and may, therefore, not be indicative of the
true extent of financial integration. Indeed, actual capital flows may
be more relevant for examining the role of foreign capital in the
growth process. This is why, in addition to de jure measures of capital
account openness, we also use measures of gross and net inflows of
foreign capital, and its components. Because we are interested in
long-term growth, we also use measures of stocks of foreign assets and
liabilities—as measures of long-term outflows and inflows—
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). These flow and stock
measures can be scaled by gross domestic product (GDP) or the level
of the population/workforce, depending on the theory being tested.  
Clearly, we face a combinatorial explosion in terms of the appropri-
ate measures. Our strategy will be to present results from a core
specification, which we consider to be representative of the large
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volume of results that we have obtained. Wherever there are departures
from the core specification or when other combinations of the data
showed markedly different results, we will mention them.
Financial integration and growth
The starting point in our analysis is that, consistent with Kose and
others (2006), there is no relationship, in a broad sample of countries,
between GDP growth and the levels of financial openness as measured
by stock or flow measures, or between GDP growth and changes in
these measures. In Chart 7, we plot the average growth of nonindustrial
Chart 7
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Notes: The Chinn-Ito Index is taken from Chinn and Ito (2006). Data for the second and third panels
are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The Feldstein-Horioka coefficients are based on ordinary least
squares regressions of Investment/GDP on Savings/GDP, run separately for each country using nonover-
lapping five-year averaged data. These coefficients are plotted against average annual real per capita GDP
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countries in the Bosworth-Collins (2003) sample over the period 1970-
2000 against the de jure Chinn-Ito (2006) measure of capital account
restrictiveness, the average stock of gross foreign assets and liabilities to
GDP, average net FDI inflows, and the Feldstein-Horioka (1980)
correlation coefficient.
6 In all cases, the slope is essentially flat and never
significantly different from zero.
A more formal regression analysis of the cross-country relationship
between growth and foreign capital, building on the work of Bosworth
and Collins (2003), reveals a similar picture. The dependent variable in
Table 1 is the annual average growth rate of per capita (purchasing
power parity-adjusted) GDP, taken from the Penn World Tables. We
include the following controls in the standard specification: log of
initial (1970) per capita GDP, initial period life expectancy, initial
period trade openness (the Sachs-Warner measure), the fiscal balance, a
measure of institutional quality, and dummies for sub-Saharan African
countries and oil exporters. In columns 1 to 5 of Table 1, we succes-
sively include different measures of stocks and flows of foreign capital
and de jure measures of capital account openness in this specification. 
With one exception, in column 3 of the table, when we use the sum
of inflows and outflows of FDI and portfolio equity as a measure of
capital openness, we do not find a positive and significant relation-
ship. But even this result is fragile; dropping one outlier (Singapore)
renders the coefficient statistically insignificant.
In interpreting these results, it is important to note that at least one
form of reverse causation is not a serious issue. If anything, higher
growth should lead to more capital account openness and higher
capital inflows, which should generate a positive correlation between
these measures and growth. The fact that the estimated coefficients
are all insignificant, despite the positive bias that should result from
reverse causation, is noteworthy. 
One concern is that our results may be dominated by recent crises.
We reestimated the regressions for the period 1985-1997, a period
which could be considered the heyday of recent financial globalization
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Table 1
Financial Integration and Growth
(Dependent Variable: Average Real 
Per Capita GDP Growth, 1970-2000)
Initial income -1.517 *** -1.484 *** -1.521 *** -1.442 *** -1.469 *** -1.273 *** -1.259 *** -1.242 ***
(0.296) (0.281) (0.282) (0.283) (0.278) (0.213) (0.208) (0.220)
Initial life expectancy 0.044 *  0.059 **  0.053 **  0.050 **  0.055 **  0.016  0.026 0.026
(0.029)  (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Sachs-Warner  1.840 ***  1.947 ***  1.753 ***  2.012 ***  1.912 ***  1.585 **  1.701 **  1.713 **
(0.615)  (0.676) (0.664) (0.736) (0.619) (0.631) (0.582) (0.617)
Fiscal balance/GDP  0.160 ***  0.096 *  0.112 ***  0.166 ***  0.154 ***  0.047  0.062  0.064
(0.061) (0.061)  (0.047) (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.052) (0.051) (0.056)
Institutional quality  5.017 ***  4.452 ***  4.293 ***  4.499 *** 4.648 ***  4.816 **  4.505 **  4.470 **
(1.614) (1.603)  (1.531) (1.835)  (1.724)  (1.504) (1.590) (1.595)
Stock of FDI liabilities 0.742
/GDP (0.873)
Net FDI flows/GDP -3.892
(11.304)
Gross FDI+equity  8.895 **
flows/GDP (4.293)
Chinn-Ito capital account -0.137
openness measure  (0.177)
Stock of total foreign assets  -0.152
and liabilities/GDP  (0.228)
Stock of total foreign  0.019 ***
assets/GDP (0.005)
Stock of total foreign  -0.015 ***
liabilities/GDP (0.003)
Net foreign assets/GDP  0.014 ***
(0.004)
Net foreign assets/GDP if  0.011 *
net foreign assets/GDP >0 (0.006)
Net foreign assets/GDP if  0.025 *
net foreign assets/GDP <0 (0.014)
Adjusted Rsquared  0.697  0.686 0.700  0.697  0.699  0.775 0.770  0.754
Number of observations  59  61  61  59  59  59  59  59
Notes: Financial integration measures are taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and Chinn and
Ito (2006). Regressions, including stock measures of financial integration, exclude two countries for
which we did not have those data. In the last column, we interact dummies for countries with average
net-foreign-assets-to-GDP ratios above and below zero, respectively, with the average net-foreign-assets-
to-GDP ratio. Dummies for oil-exporting countries and sub-Saharan African countries are included in
all regressions. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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because there was a sharp increase in capital flows toward developing
countries during this period. The period was also largely a tranquil one
in financial markets (barring the Tequila Crisis in late 1994). Our
results for this period (not shown here), however, were not qualitatively
different from those for the period 1970-2000 that we have just
reported. Finally, we checked that the slope on the financial integration
variable is not different for emerging markets. 
Admittedly, our approach here is a crude one, and we do not
formally examine nonlinearities in the relationship between financial
integration and growth, or the possibility of threshold effects—
whereby the beneficial effects of financial integration may show up
only when the right initial conditions are in place. Our main point
here is that detecting the potential beneficial effects is hardly as
straightforward as theory would suggest.
7
Current account balances and growth
We now will look at the correlation between current accounts and
growth. Not only is the current account a summary of the net flows
out of a country, but it is also the right measure when we consider
issues like aggregate savings and investment, as well as exchange rate
overvaluation, all of which will be important in what follows.
8
There is a well-developed theory of the life cycle model applied to
countries that has implications for the evolution of current account
balances (see the discussion in Chinn and Prasad, 2003). Poor coun-
tries that open up to foreign capital early in the development process
would be expected to run current account deficits as they import
capital to finance their investment opportunities. Eventually, these
countries would become relatively capital rich and begin to run trade
surpluses, in part to pay off the obligations built up through their
accumulated current account deficits. Thus, the relationship between
the level of the current account and relative income across countries
is likely to be U-shaped, with the very poor not being open or able to
borrow, the moderately poor running large current account deficits,
and the rich running surpluses.
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Notes: Country-year observations were stacked together over the period 1970-2000 and sorted by rela-
tive PPP-adjusted per capita income levels, with relative income measured against the richest country in
the sample in that year (the United States or, in some years, Switzerland). The smoothed plot was
obtained using the Lowess routine in Stata. The savings-investment plot for developing countries does
not fully match the current account plot because (1) the curves were fitted independently for the three
variables and (2) because of measurement problems, the current account to GDP ratio does not exactly
match the difference between the ratios of savings and investment to GDP for the developing countries,
especially in the early years of the sample.
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What does the evidence show? Chart 8 contains smoothed plots of
the relationship between relative income and the level of the current
account balance for nonindustrial countries and industrial countries
in the Bosworth-Collins sample.
9The lowest current account balance
for developing countries is reached at fairly low levels of relative
income, with a strong positive relationship between the current
account balance and a country’s level of relative income thereafter
(top left panel). Note that, for this group of countries, the current
account balance increases because the savings-to-GDP ratio rises even
faster than investment with rising relative income (top right panel).
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For industrial countries, though, the investment-to-GDP ratio falls
with rising relative income, even while savings increases. So, there is
the expected positive relationship between the current account
balance and relative income. Indeed, these plots are consistent with
the results of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), who show a positive
correlation between countries’ net foreign asset positions and their
relative incomes. 
While Chart 8 is about the relationship between the current
account and relative income levels of countries, the next two charts
offer a different way of characterizing the role of foreign capital in
growth. In Chart 9A, we plot the simple correlation between growth
and the current account balance for the sample of nonindustrial
countries. Note that these are unconditional correlations that do not
control for the typical variables that are associated with growth. 
We will include these variables shortly. But it is clear that even uncon-
ditionally, there is a strong positive correlation, suggesting that
countries that rely less on foreign capital grow more. There may be a
concern that the correlation is driven by underperforming countries
that receive lots of aid, so in Chart 9B we drop countries that received
average annual aid of more than 10 percent of GDP. The magnitude
of the correlation is now larger. 
In Chart 10, we examine growth rates, splitting the sample of nonin-
dustrial countries into four groups, depending on whether they are
above or below the median levels of the ratios of investment to GDP
and current account to GDP, respectively. The chart shows that coun-
tries with higher levels of investment fare better than those with lower
levels, which is not surprising. What is noteworthy is that countries
that had high investment ratios and lower reliance on foreign savings
(lower current account deficits) grew faster—on average, by about 1
percent a year—compared with countries that had high investment
but also a greater degree of reliance on foreign capital. 
A similar picture from a different perspective is in Chart 11, where
we plot the relationship between growth and the current account for
countries that experienced growth spurts (as identified by Hausmann,
Rodrik, and Pritchett, 2005), differentiating their performance before
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Notes: Sample excludes Nicaragua. Including Nicaragua yields larger positive coefficient.
B: Sample Excluding Countries with Aid/GDP >0.10
A: Full Sample
Chart 9
Current Account Balance and Growth in Developing Countries
1970-2000: Unconditional Relationship
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and during the growth spurt. On average, current account balances
increase around the beginning of growth spurts (or, put differently,
current account deficits narrow), with the lower panel showing
savings growing faster than investment. In other words, while going
from slow to faster growth, countries also reduce foreign financing of
domestic investment. 
This is not to say that all forms of foreign finance fall during growth
spurts. Indeed, in the five years following the initiation of a growth
spurt, the average FDI-to-GDP ratio rises from an annual average of
0.2 percent in the five years before to 0.7 percent. Similarly, using the
Jones and Olken (2005) episodes of growth decelerations, we find
that the average FDI-to-GDP ratio falls from an average of 1.7
percent in the five years before the deceleration to 1 percent in the
five years after. But even these increases and decreases are small
compared to the changes in domestic savings following a growth
spurt or deceleration. 
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Chart 11

























Notes: Timings of growth spurts are based on Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005).
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Having identified what appears to be a clear association between
current account balances and growth, we now turn to a more formal
analysis of this relationship in a regression framework similar to the
one used in the previous section to examine the effects of financial
integration on growth. The regression results are presented in Table 2.
The dependent variable is the average per capita GDP growth rate
over the period 1970-2000, and the covariates are the standard ones
as in the previous section. When we include the full nonindustrial
country sample, the coefficient on the current account balance is
positive and tightly estimated (column 1). 
Nicaragua appears to be a significant outlier in such regressions.
Dropping Nicaragua from the sample yields our core specification
(column 2), in which the coefficient on the current account remains
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient estimate
suggests that a 1 percent increase in the growth rate is associated with
a 1 percentage point improvement in the current account. The regres-
sion estimates are robust to dropping different outliers or dummying
out groups like oil exporters. 
Importantly, the correlation between growth and the current
account balance is strongest and positive for poor countries, moderate
and positive for emerging markets, and negative and significant for
industrial countries (Table 2, column 3). The marginal relationship
between growth and the current account suggested by the regression is
as follows: For industrial countries, it is negative, -0.15 (0.12 minus
0.26), and both significantly different from that of nonindustrial
countries and significantly different from zero. For emerging markets,
it is positive, 0.06 (0.12 minus 0.06), but not statistically significantly
different from the coefficient on other developing countries of 0.12.
Thus, it turns out that while developing countries grow faster by
relying less on foreign savings, it is just the opposite for industrial
countries. Put another way, neither China nor the United States, both
fast-growing countries for their stage of development, are running
perverse current account balances relative to the norm. They are just
extreme examples of their respective class of country.
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Table 2
Current Account Deficits and Growth: Cross-Section Regres-
sions for Developing Countries (Dependent Variable: Average
Real Per Capita GDP Growth, 1970-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current account/GDP  0.139 ***  0.098 **  0.121 **  -0.002  0.112 ***  0.082 *  0.077 *
(0.037)  (0.046) (0.053) (0.062) (0.044) (0.048)  (0.047)
Initial income  -1.293 *** -1.257 ***
(0.193) (0.203) 
Initial life expectancy  0.035 *  0.032 *
(0.025) (0.024) 
Sachs-Warner  1.872 ***  1.879 *** 
(0.649)  (0.649) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  0.019  0.023 
(0.050) (0.044) 
Institutional quality  4.054 ***  4.252 *** 
(1.522) (1.533) 
Industrial countries  -0.264 ***
(0.078)
Emerging markets  -0.062
(0.151)
Savings/GDP 0.089  ***
(0.033)
Investment/GDP 0.076  **
(0.032)
Overvaluation  -0.007 * -0.007 **
(0.005) (0.004)
Ratio of working-age population  0.150 ***  0.141 ***  0.134 ***
to total population  (0.054)  (0.048)  (0.050)
Adjusted Rsquared  0.753  0.741  0.735  0.773  0.758  0.790  0.790  0.800
Number of observations 61  60  82  60  60  60  60  60
Notes: Column 2 and subsequent regressions exclude Nicaragua. Column 3 includes industrial coun-
tries. The regressions reported in columns 3 through 8 include the same set of basic controls (rows 2
through 6) as those in columns 1 and 2, including dummies for oil-exporting countries and sub-Saharan
African countries. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Robustness
We conducted a number of sensitivity experiments to ensure that
the positive correlation between current account balances and growth
is robust (detailed results are available from the authors). We first
checked if the result is driven by failed states—countries that have very
low growth and receive lots of foreign aid. Dropping countries that
obtain an annual average aid of more than 10 percent of GDP shrank
the sample size by 10 countries, but the coefficient estimate on the
current account was larger than in the baseline and significant. We also
confirmed that no single country or group drives the estimate. When
we estimated slopes separately for each region, the coefficients were
statistically significant both for Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but not
for Latin America. 
A second concern could be that we are not picking up a cross-
sectional result, but a time series result; the successful, rich countries
may have started by running large deficits, but eventually become
rich enough to run surpluses. When we restricted the sample to (ex
post) middle-income countries—neither rich enough to be running
large surpluses, nor poor enough to be drawing aid—the coefficient
estimate on the current account was again higher than in the baseline
and significant. We also restricted our analysis to the period 1985-
1997, the heyday of recent global integration and before a number of
emerging markets started building massive reserves. Again, we drop
the high-aid countries. The coefficient estimate on the current
account was once more higher than in the baseline. 
It is worth emphasizing at this stage that we have identified a posi-
tive association between current account balances and long-run
growth in nonindustrial countries that holds in many subsamples. At
no point do we find a negative correlation, as might be suggested by
standard theoretical models. Particularly puzzling is that we have
some evidence that private capital inflows, such as FDI, do seem to
be positively associated with growth—more in line with the theory
(see, for instance, Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998). While
correlation is not causation, a number of questions do arise. Why do
fast-growing nonindustrial countries not rely much overall on foreign
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finance, even though they do seem to rely on some forms of private
finance?
10 Put differently, fast-growing countries that get a lot of net
FDI must be using proportionately less of other forms of capital, or
even exporting these forms, so that their overall reliance on foreign
finance is low. Why is this so?
Some conjectures about explanations
There are a few, not mutually exclusive, possible explanations. The
first is that the factors that drive the investment opportunities that in
turn lead to growth, such as exogenous increases in productivity or
demographic changes, also produce the domestic savings needed to
finance those opportunities—at least the fraction that is accessible
given institutional constraints. For example, in industrial countries,
unexpected but sustained increases in productivity will produce
higher current and future incomes, as well as higher investment as
corporations borrow to finance investment. In anticipation of higher
future incomes, consumers will not just spend out of income but also
borrow to consume more, and thus reduce savings. Therefore, higher
growth should be correlated with larger current account deficits, a
pattern we do see for industrial countries. 
But what if the financial sector in a country is underdeveloped and
domestic and foreign finance cannot be easily intermediated to firms
or consumers? Then, corporate investment could be limited to the
funds firms generate internally from past investment, while
consumers save much of the increased income stemming from the
increase in productivity. It is possible that an increase in productivity
could be accompanied by some increase in investment but an even
greater increase in savings, thus resulting in a positive correlation
between growth and current accounts, as well as growth and savings.
Savings, in this view, carries substantial information about a develop-
ing country’s productivity, perhaps more than investment.
If foreign inflows responded largely to investment opportunities,
there should be an unambiguously negative relationship between
growth and the current account. The fact that the relationship is posi-
tive provides a hint that domestic savings is a driving force. Indeed,
recall that Chart 8, which shows the smoothed plots of savings- and
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investment-to-GDP ratios against relative income levels, provides
suggestive evidence that savings and the current account track each
other closely. The simple cross-sectional correlation between savings
and the current account is positive and strong (0.72) while that
between investment and the current account is much weaker (0.26). 
When we included the savings-to-GDP ratio in our core specifica-
tion, the coefficient on the current account is driven down to zero
(results available from the authors). By contrast, when we included
the investment-to-GDP ratio, the estimated coefficient on the
current account is virtually unchanged relative to the baseline. This
suggests that the behavior of savings, not investment, is key to under-
standing the relationship between the current account and growth.
This is at odds with standard theoretical models. Given similar tech-
nologies for a pair of developing countries, the one that can invest
more—presumably by borrowing foreign capital to supplement
domestic savings—should grow faster during its transition or devel-
opment phase, as its income level converges to that of advanced
industrial countries. Yet, the level of investment seems not to matter
in explaining growth, when the level of domestic savings is included. 
As suggested above, the relative underdevelopment of the financial
sector might explain the strength of the link between productivity
and savings in a poor economy (as well as the correlation between
growth and the current account). If the financial sector were strong,
a sustained increase in productivity would not only result in more
investment (as firms borrow to take advantage of investment oppor-
tunities), but also more consumption as consumers borrow in
anticipation of their higher income. Conversely, a weak financial
sector could translate a sustained increase in the productivity of
certain sectors into weaker investment growth (Wurgler, 2000) and
greater savings growth.
11 Note that this explanation requires that the
sources of productivity growth for developing countries lie largely
outside the financial system, or alternatively, that limited develop-
ment of the financial system does not hold back productivity growth.
This is not implausible, given that these countries are only catching
up in technology, and the role of the financial system in fostering
frontier innovation is relatively limited.
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The data suggest that the quality of the financial system does
matter. When we estimated the core specification separately for
nonindustrial countries that have below-median financial develop-
ment and for those that have above-median financial development,
the coefficient is almost twice as large for the former and statistically
significant only in that case.
The explanations thus far constitute a relatively benign view of the
pattern of global current account imbalances. The fastest-growing
developing countries generate more savings than they can use, in
part because their financial system may be underdeveloped. The
surpluses (or the lower deficits) they run are both good news because
they reflect the fact that investment is very productive and bad news
because they reflect the need to develop the financial system (so as to
permit more resources to be productively invested, as well as to
permit more borrowing for consumption). Foreign capital could be
beneficial in this view, but development of the domestic financial
system is a necessary precondition.  
A less-benign explanation is that excessive reliance on foreign
capital (that is, large current account deficits) can result in currency
overvaluation, especially if the quality of investment in a country is
not particularly good (so that the supply of nontraded goods does
not grow commensurately with the increasing demand for them as
foreign capital flows in, leading to what is traditionally called
“Dutch disease”—an increasing relative price of nontraded goods
and exchange rate overvaluation). Such overvaluation can hurt the
domestic manufacturing sector, which is important for growth in
nonindustrial countries. 
We find that overvaluation is negatively correlated with growth in
nonindustrial countries.
13 Interestingly, we do not find any significant
correlation between overvaluation and growth for industrial countries.
One possible explanation is that the imperative to avoid overvaluation
is greater for developing countries because of their greater need to
develop the low-value-added trade/manufacturing sector, an impera-
tive that their industrial country counterparts have moved past as they
have specialized to a much greater extent in high-value-added services.
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Another possibility is that industrial countries are institutionally more
advanced, open, and flexible, and this helps them avoid the deleteri-
ous effects of capital inflows on competitiveness. 
But a country’s ability to avoid overvaluation also is affected by
openness to capital inflows. Preliminary evidence suggests that capital
inflows (but not policy measures of capital account openness) do seem
to be related to proneness to overvaluation. 
Again, we do not find a similar relationship between foreign capital
flows and the exchange rate for industrial countries. There could be
many (deeper) causes for a tendency for foreign capital flows to induce
overvaluation in developing countries but not in industrial ones. For
example, in Africa and Latin America, openness to capital possibly
reflects the power of political elites in imparting an urban/consump-
tion bias to policies: In this view, openness to capital is part of a
complex of policies that tends to support consumption and overvalu-
ation. This differential correlation is nevertheless interesting for our
purposes and sheds some light on the impact of foreign capital.
Thoughts on global imbalances
Before we conclude, let us speculate about the recent emergence of
global imbalances in light of the findings of this paper. The now-
standard view is that there were three distinct phases in the evolution
of global current account imbalances. In the first stage, in the late
1990s, a variety of crises in the emerging markets and Japan led to a
collapse in investment opportunities there, freeing up savings, while
strong productivity growth made the United States an attractive
place to invest in (Bernanke, 2005; World Economic Outlook, WEO,
2005). In the second stage, in the early 2000s, the bursting of the IT
bubble was met with very accommodative policies in developed
countries, particularly the United States. Consumption increased
and savings fell, especially in countries with robust mortgage
markets, where rising house prices and the associated wealth effects
provided good support. In the third stage, strong growth and the
associated oil and commodity price shock widened but also shifted
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While the collapse in investment in Asian emerging markets during
the first phase is well-documented and understood, the significant
increase in private savings in a number of emerging markets since the
late 1990s (WEO, 2005), including those that did not experience
crisis, has not been commented upon. Indeed, in models of the first
phase, like Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006), people in emerg-
ing markets would not increase savings when faced with a loss of local
investment opportunities and falling worldwide interest rates. One
could invoke an enormous increase in the precautionary demand for
savings by citizens who have experienced crisis to explain the rise in
savings, but it is hard to explain why private savings also increased so
much in noncrisis countries and why they continue to be high.
Our paper offers an alternative view. Perhaps it was not just the
United States that experienced a surge in productivity (in part
because of the information and communication technology revolu-
tion). Partly because of the reorganization of global production and
partly because the surge was transmitted through global supply chains
and trade, so did emerging markets, including China. 
It is not surprising that the United States, a flexible economy with
a strong financial sector, was well-poised to take advantage of the
productivity shock. It increased its current account deficit, in the
manner predicted by the standard intertemporal open economy
model (Glick and Rogoff, 1995). In the emerging markets that expe-
rienced strong productivity growth, the rise in productivity may have
generated an initial boom in investment in some, as weak financial
systems lent indiscriminately, followed by a bust, after which the
financial systems, imbued with caution that comes from crisis, under-
stood their limited ability to intermediate savings into domestic
investment.
14Thus, the postcrisis increase in savings and reduction in
investment in a number of emerging markets may have been the
more normal response of countries with weak financial systems in
response to productivity shocks. In sum, the asymmetric responses to
a productivity shock that may have originated in the United States,
but that got transmitted to its poorer trading partners, may well have
created savings and investment patterns that led to the observed
pattern of current account imbalances.  
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Our paper, thus, suggests why despite both experiencing significant
increases in productivity over the last 10 years, the current accounts of
the United States and China have moved very differently. Over this
time, China has averaged a current account surplus of 2.8 percent of
GDP, significant amounts of it invested in the United States, while the
United States has averaged a current account deficit of 3.7 percent of
GDP. This pattern appears perverse and clearly runs counter to the
benchmark model of growth theory. Our results, by contrast, suggest
that, while China and the United States may be extreme observations in
the groups of developing and industrial countries, respectively, they
reflect a more general and historic pattern within their respective groups. 
Finally, let us end on a note of caution. Even if imbalances are equi-
librium responses to a particular set of circumstances, this does not
mean that they can be sustained at this level into the medium term.
When a large country runs a trade deficit of 6 percent of GDP for a
long time, it will eventually find financing harder to come by. One
should not confuse the words “equilibrium” and “stability.”
Discussion
What is clear from our analysis is that nonindustrial countries that
have relied on foreign capital have not grown faster than those that
have not. Indeed, taken at face value, there is a growth premium asso-
ciated with these countries not relying on foreign finance—though
we do not have strong evidence to suggest this association is causal.
Equally clearly, though, the reliance of these countries on domestic
savings to finance investment comes at a cost—there is less invest-
ment and consumption than there would be if these countries could
draw in foreign capital on the same terms as industrial countries.
It does not seem to us that these nonindustrial countries are building
foreign assets just to serve as collateral, which can then draw in beneficial
forms of foreign financing such as FDI (see, for example, Dooley, Folk-
erts-Landau, and Garber, 2004).
15 Rather, it seems to us that successful
developing countries have limited absorptive capacity for foreign
resources, whether it is because their financial markets are underdeveloped
or because their economies are prone to overvaluation caused by rapid
capital inflows.
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As countries develop, absorptive capacity grows. The strong recent
growth of emerging Europe, accompanied by growing current account
deficits, probably has a lot to do with the strengthening of their finan-
cial sectors, in part through the entry of foreign banks. Only time will
tell whether there are any effects on the exchange rate and on compet-
itiveness, as well as whether this phenomenon is sustainable. So, all
conclusions we draw from this episode have to be tentative. 
What does all this mean for policies toward capital account open-
ness? Any discussion of the merits of capital account openness is likely
to be very specific to a country.
16 Our results suggest, however, that
insofar as the need to avoid overvaluation is important and the
domestic financial sector is underdeveloped, greater caution toward
certain forms of foreign capital inflows might be warranted. At the
same time, financial openness may itself be needed to spur domestic
financial development (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales, 2003,
and Kose and others, 2006). 
This suggests that, even though reformers in developing countries
might want to wait to achieve a certain level of financial development
before pushing for financial integration, the prospect of financial
integration and ensuing competition may be needed to spur domes-
tic financial development. One approach worth considering might be
a firm commitment to integrate financial markets at a definite future
date, thus, giving time for the domestic financial system to develop
without possible adverse effects from capital inflows, even while
giving participants the incentive to press for it by suspending the
sword of future foreign competition over their heads.
17
In conclusion, a pessimistic read of this paper would suggest that
because development itself may be the antidote to any of the delete-
rious effects of foreign capital, or to the ability of poor countries to
absorb more capital, only some forms of foreign capital may play a
direct role in the development process. Certainly, the role of foreign
capital in expanding a country’s resource constraints may be limited.
A more optimistic read would qualify this with two important
caveats. First, a better understanding of how to increase a country’s
absorptive capacity would allow developing countries to benefit from
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foreign finance, even during the process of development. Second, it
may be that some attributes of foreign capital, such as its volatility,
contribute to the limited absorptive capacity of the recipients (see, for
example, Aizenman and others, 2004). There may be ways for coun-
tries that send capital to nonindustrial countries to reduce the
volatility of the capital they send out. More research would clearly
elevate the level of optimism. 
Authors’ note: The authors are grateful to Menzie Chinn, Josh Felman, Olivier Jeanne, and
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Appendix
Our baseline sample, which is similar to that of Bosworth and
Collins (2003), includes 22 industrial and 61 nonindustrial coun-
tries. (We are one short of the Bosworth-Collins sample as we do not
have some of the requisite data for Taiwan.)
Industrial countries
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN),
Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DFA),
Greece (GRC), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan
(JPN), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR),
Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE),
United Kingdom (GBR), and United States (USA).
Nonindustrial countries
Algeria (DZA), Argentina (ARG), Bangladesh (BGD), Bolivia
(BOL), Brazil (BRA), Cameroon (CMR), Chile (CHL), China
(CHN), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), Cyprus (CYP),  Ivory
Coast (CIV), Dominican Republic (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt
(EGY), El Salvador (SLV), Ethiopia (ETH), Ghana (GHA),
Guatemala (GTM), Guyana (GUY), Haiti (HTI), Honduras (HND),
India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Islamic Republic of Iran (IRN), Israel
(ISR), Jamaica (JAM), Jordan (JOR), Kenya (KEN), Korea (KOR),
Madagascar (MDG), Malawi (MWI), Malaysia (MYS), Mali (MLI),
Mauritius (MUS), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Mozambique
(MOZ), Nicaragua (NIC), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Panama
(PAN), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Rwanda
(RWA), Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone (SLE), Singapore (SGP), South
Africa (ZAF), Sri Lanka (LKA), Tanzania (TZA), Thailand (THA),
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), Uganda
(UGA), Uruguay (URY), Venezuela (VEN), Zambia (ZMB), and
Zimbabwe (ZWE).
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Endnotes
1Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) provide evidence of a negative correlation
between capital inflows and investment rates.
2The simple explanation that in poor countries investment is constrained by the
availability of domestic savings is not enough, for growth would then be strongly
correlated with domestic investment. 
3The Appendix lists the countries in our sample. The sample does not include the
transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as data avail-
ability for these countries is limited.
4Excluding the oil-exporting countries did not alter the basic patterns in Chart 2.
We also constructed these plots using initial (1970) relative income, rather than
relative income in each period, in order to take out the effects of income conver-
gence. This also did not make much of a difference to the shapes of the plots. 
5Indeed, there was a sharp surge in FDI flows to poorer countries between the
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, reflecting a spate of privatizations, including in
telecom and other utilities.
6We chose 1970 as the starting point mainly for data reasons: Both stock and flow
data become available after about 1970. We exclude Singapore, which is an outlier,
from this chart. The sum of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP is the
measure of de facto integration recommended by Kose and others (2006). Feldstein
and Horioka interpret a strong positive correlation between domestic saving and
domestic investment (both measured relative to GDP) as an indicator of limited
integration with international financial markets. Nonindustrial countries with a
low correlation, which are presumed to be well-integrated with international finan-
cial markets according to this measure, should grow faster according to the theory.
We estimate country-specific Feldstein-Horioka correlations using nonoverlapping
five-year averaged data on savings and investment over the period 1970-2000.
7Kose and others (2006) note that studies using macroeconomic data have not
been able to find strong evidence of the presumed benefits of financial integration
on growth. There is growing evidence that these benefits are contingent on levels of
human capital, financial development, and trade openness. Certain types of spillover
effects from financial integration have been detected more clearly in microeconomic
(firm- and industry-level) data. It also may be that the positive growth effects will be
evident only over longer periods. While three decades is presumably a long enough
period to detect the “short-run pain, long-run gain” view (see, for example,
Krugman, 2002), it is also true that the integration of developing countries into
international financial markets really took off only in the mid-1980s.
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8A current account surplus has to equal the sum of (1) net private and official
outflows of financial capital (this includes debt and nongrant aid, but not remit-
tances—the latter should properly be reflected in the current account itself); (2) net
errors and omissions (a positive number could, for instance, represent capital flight
through unofficial channels); and (3) net accumulation of international reserves by
the government (typically, the central bank). Thus, the current account surplus
summarizes the net amount of capital flowing out of the country, the excess of
domestic savings over domestic investment (or, in the case of a current account
deficit, the net amount of capital flowing in, or, equivalently, the excess of domes-
tic investment over domestic savings). 
9To generate this plot, country-year observations were stacked together over the
period 1970-2000 and sorted by relative PPP-adjusted per capita income levels, with
relative income measured against the richest country in the sample in that year (the
United States or, in some years, Switzerland). The smoothed plot was obtained using
the Lowess routine in Stata. There are two reasons why the savings-investment plot
for developing countries does not fully match the current account plot. First, the
curves were fitted independently for the three variables. Second, because of measure-
ment problems, the current-account-to-GDP ratio does not exactly match the
difference between the ratios of savings and investment to GDP for the developing
countries, especially in the early years of the sample. 
10Clearly, one explanation must be that certain forms of private finance, like FDI,
bring benefits, such as technology transfer, that go beyond financing. 
11Jappelli and Pagano (1994) build a model showing how financial market imper-
fections that limit the ability to borrow against future income could generate a
correlation between savings and growth in a fast-growing economy with a low level
of financial development.
12Bosworth and Collins (1999) find that FDI inflows have a large positive corre-
lation with both investment and saving, implying no net change in the current
account. Perhaps one explanation is that savings increases as a result of productiv-
ity growth, which also draws in FDI. Aghion, Comin, and Howitt (2006) also
report a positive correlation between FDI and lagged domestic savings but have a
different explanation than ours.
13We use a measure of exchange rate overvaluation because of Johnson, Ostry, and
Subramanian (2006). These authors estimate the following cross-section equation
for every year since 1970 for the sample of all countries: 
log ρ i= α + β log y i+ εi
where ρ is the log of the price level for country i in terms of the United States, and
y is the level of per capita PPP GDP. The measure of overvaluation is then:
overvali = log ρ i – (α + β log y i).
Similar measures are used by Frankel (2003) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005).
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14Clearly, investment in China is not low, despite a less-than-effective financial
system. A variety of agency problems at the provincial government level, in state-
owned enterprises, and in state-owned banks have led to excessive investment in
some areas. Nevertheless, Chinese savings are even higher than its high level of
investment. More generally, moderately developed financial systems may be more
cautious about investing because they understand and operate within their limita-
tions than either underdeveloped financial systems, which neither understand nor
operate within their limitations, or developed financial systems that have overcome
limitations. Indeed, in addition to naturally being more cautious after experiencing
a crisis, much of emerging Asia may have moved from underdeveloped to moder-
ately developed after the crisis, which may explain the investment restraint.
15Why, for example, would Korea or Taiwan find comfort when they make direct
investments in China if it holds enormous amounts of U.S. government securities?
16For instance, capital account openness is more than just opening up to inward
flows; it also means allowing outward flows. Outward flows could relieve incipient
appreciation pressures on the exchange rate, but also could be a source of fragility,
especially if the financial sector is underdeveloped. The fragility associated with the
exit of capital could be attenuated if an economy is more open to trade (Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2004, and Frankel and Cavallo, 2004); trade openness could
also mitigate the adverse effects of crises.   
17The Chinese approach of trying to spur banking reform by committing to
opening up their banking sector to foreign competition in early 2007 as part of
their World Trade Organization commitments can be seen in this light. Prasad and
Rajan (2005) suggest an alternative strategy for dealing with the adverse effects of
inflows through controlled liberalization of outflows (essentially by securitizing
inflows), which would allow countries experiencing large capital inflows to develop
their domestic financial markets and simultaneously mitigate appreciation pressures
associated with the inflows.
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